Who controls who? Embodied control within human-technology choreographies by Tuuri, Kai et al.
This is the accepted manuscript of the article, which has been published in Interacting with 
Computers. 2017, 29(4), 494-511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iwc/iww040
WHO CONTROLS WHO? 1 
 EMBODIED CONTROL WITHIN HUMAN–TECHNOLOGY 
CHOREOGRAPHIES 
KAI TUURI1,*, JAANA PARVIAINEN2 AND ANTTI PIRHONEN3
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Abstract: In this article we explore issues of embodied control that relate to current and 
future technologies in which body movements function as an instrument of control. Instead of 
just seeing ourselves in control, it is time to consider how these technologies actually control 
our moving bodies and transform our lived spaces. By shifting the focus from devices to 
choreographies among devices, we perform a theoretical analysis of the multidimensional 
aspects that reside within embodied interaction with technology. We suggest that it is 
beneficial to acknowledge and reformulate the phenomena of embodied control that go 
beyond the instrumental user-to-device control scheme. Drawing upon the phenomenology of 
the body, ecological psychology, and embodied cognitive science, we identify three different 
dimensions of embodied control: instrumental, experiential, and infrastructural. Design 
implications of this theoretical model are also discussed. 
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Research highlights: 
• This paper clarifies the roles of technology and human beings in terms of movements
and control: how we use movements in the control of technology, and reciprocally, how
our movements are controlled by technology, thus constituting technology-induced
choreographies.
1 Here we apologize for this small deviation from conventional grammar, but we wanted to use 
linguistic means to emphasize the reciprocal and ambiguous nature of control. 
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• The theoretical framework presented promotes the viewpoint of phenomenological 
philosophy on human–technology studies. This is done especially by treating 
movements as lived experiences that constitute humans as embodied beings. 
• The analysis of embodied control allows researchers and practitioners to be mindful in 
their visions and conceptualizations of body movement and control among different 
human–technology assemblages.  
• For HCI-related empirical research and practical design, this study formulates new 
ontological and epistemological groundings as well as new conceptual tools.  
• For interaction design, this paper underlines and illustrates the power and 
responsibilities embedded in developing instruments of control that contribute to 
choreographing human movements. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The common rhetoric of technological discourse has emphasized recurrently how new 
gadgets and gizmos will transform everyday life in the near future. Although our personal and 
public surroundings are already filling up with various fancy gadgets and gizmos, we rarely 
start to reflect on how our engagement with all those technologies actually changes our 
everyday embodied living. In this article, we look at some of this transformational potential of 
technology by discussing how implementations of so-called smart technology affect our 
bodily flow of everyday activities and movements – that is, routines and everyday 
choreographies we regularly engage in, but of whose real contents and embedded meanings 
we rarely trouble ourselves to become aware.  
Our surroundings consist of built architectures, pieces of furniture, devices, as well as 
rituals of behavior and other aspects that have an effect on how we move around. Instead of 
seeing these surroundings merely as a “neutral, external backdrop to human activities” 
(Ingold, 1993, p. 152), we consider surroundings as temporal continuums, regarding them as 
spaces of possible practices and engagement that are constituted through the activities of 
dwelling in them (Ingold, 1993). Within such temporal continuums, our everyday actions are 
constantly choreographed through engagements with both the natural and the technologized 
surroundings. In line with ecological psychology, one can consider these effects on 
movements in terms of action affordances, referring to perceived possibilities of action 
offered or denied by the environment (Gibson, 1979). Within a conceptual framework of 
choreographies, we can also understand them as pre-choreographies (Parviainen, Tuuri, & 
Pirhonen, 2013a) or as choreographic inscriptions (Loke & Kocaballi, 2016), both referring 
to elements in design (material and social) that constitute movement configurations, either 
purposely or as an unintended side effect. Technological artifacts and user interfaces do not 
exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are inevitably fused into the context of a more general 
physical and social infrastructure that facilitates, triggers, guides, and orientates the dynamics 
of everyday movements. Therefore, emergence of choreographies within the human–
technology relationship is not simply a matter of how routines become accommodated with 
each new piece of technology, because each piece of technology potentially has an effect on 
the whole infrastructure that defines everyday encounters with spaces and environments 
(see Dourish & Bell, 2007).  
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Despite the ever-growing concern regarding contextual factors and everyday life related 
to interaction design (e.g., Arthur 2010; Beyer & Holtzblatt, 1998; Carroll, 2000; Savat, 
2013), the predominant stance is still more or less focused on the use of devices or 
applications. The use-oriented undercurrent in thinking is perfectly understandable, 
considering the roots of human–computer interaction (HCI) and the fact that the designers’ 
business is ultimately in developing discrete products for the markets. According to Harper 
(2003, p. 22), the adaption of digital technologies into homes can generate various conflicts 
with “appropriate behavior” for different times and places. The home is an example of a place 
for the plurality of occasions, ranging from resting to hosting friends or living out personal 
desires to sharing space with others who may have different desires. Therefore, the home is 
not a singularity for which straightforward needs for using technology could be defined. It 
may be easier to delineate such needs for more particular contexts of professional tasks, but 
the ways that technological devices are marketed to consumers are largely a technology-push 
rather than demand-pull (e.g., Blanson Hankemans, Alpay, & Dumay, 2010). In the bigger 
picture, the technological development relating to, for example, smart-homes, smart-cars or 
the Internet-of-things is arguably driven by collective visions and myths about ubiquitous or 
pervasive computing (see Dourish & Bell, 2011). Therefore it is important to be mindful with 
one’s visions and concepts and to avoid making too stereotyped assumptions about people's 
life and needs. 
The discussion in this article will focus on embodied interaction. For decades, 
embodiment has been a central term in the phenomenological movement, positioned in 
opposition to Cartesian mind-body division, and has been adopted relatively recently into the 
discourse of cognitive sciences (Varela, Thompson, & Rosh, 1991). The foundational value of 
embodiment as a “property of being manifest in and of the everyday world” was 
acknowledged for HCI even more recently (Dourish, 1999, p. 2). However, in the HCI field, 
embodied interaction is often understood in the more narrow terms of body and bodily 
activity as means of interaction and control. Currently emerging technologies based, for 
example, on motion sensing and gesture recognition (e.g., Rautaray & Agrawal, 2015), gaze 
tracking (e.g., Lukander, Jagadeesan, Chi, & Müller, 2013) or biometric sensing (e.g., Quek, 
Höhne, Murray-Smith, & Tangermann, 2013) are focused on utilizing bodily activity, 
gestures, and movement in the user interfaces of so-called smart applications. When looking 
at interaction through the concept of use, it is easy to see the physical movements having their 
instrumental value prioritized. Be it sweeping with a forefinger across the touch-screen of a 
smartphone, waving an arm in thin air, or intently eying a smart coffee-machine, all that 
matters is how a user’s action could be correctly interpreted by the application as an input. 
Such a narrow focus on movement or gestures through a priori instrumental value in user 
tasks (see, e.g., design guidelines in Microsoft, 2013) might hinder the formulation of the 
bigger picture regarding how devices with body-based input collide with and affect our lives 
through their intended embodiment. In this paper, we want to emphasize a broader 
understanding of the term embodied interaction, proposed as a comprehensive foundation for 
HCI that acknowledges the body through phenomenological and cultural accounts in addition 
to the technological and psychological ones (see Dourish, 2001). 
As many of the significant embodied nuances and routines in our lives remain mostly 
“invisible” and unattended by us, there clearly exists a need for new, comprehensive ways to 
become aware of and make explicit how the designs of new technological commodities 
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collide with the flowing patterns of human movement. Consequently, interaction designers 
should also be provided with robust means to extend or turn their attention towards the more 
wide-ranging perception of the designs that affect people’s embodied experience of their 
surroundings as a lived space.  
 
1.1 Objective Space vs. Lived Space 
In investigating human interactivity with smart applications, one key factor is to understand 
environments as a spatial phenomenon. Phenomenologists (e.g., Husserl, 1970; Merleau-
Ponty, 1962) have long stressed that the living human body is not a mere thing that rests in 
space like tables, stones, or computers. Spatiality that we live in and through our bodies and 
around us is called lived space. This lived space differs from the schema of Euclidean three-
dimensional geometric space. Objective space can be scrutinized and measured with fixed 
metrics, and it has become the foundation of design in architecture, engineering, digital 
technology, and the physical sciences. It is not only a useful tool, but objective space has 
dominated the understanding of space in Western culture since classical mechanics 
(Grosz, 1994; Husserl, 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Straus, 1966).  
Lived space can be considered a much more fundamental notion of space than objective 
space because all living beings and the knowledge they possess depend on the sensual and 
intentional orientation to their environments. Even plants turn their bodies to the sunlight or 
push their roots into the soil toward water sources. The motion of plants may not be conscious 
or intentional (at least in the way these concepts are traditionally understood) but nonetheless 
plants have their own lived spaces. Of course, the lived space of humans is different and much 
more complex than plants. Merleau-Ponty (1962) has addressed how the lived space emerges 
reciprocally from the human body’s perception and action, but it also carries complex 
meanings of social and affective relations that become enactively coupled with specific places 
and ways of interaction (Hutchins, 1995; Noë, 2009; Varela et al., 1991). Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1962) notion of space (l’espace) relies on Heidegger’s conception of being-in-the-world (In-
der-Welt-sein) showing how fundamental the orientation of spatial living is for us. In fact, 
following Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts, it can be argued that our postures and actions on the 
world, as constitutions of lived experience, are an integral part of our enactive consciousness, 
not necessarily being caused or driven by higher order propositional mental representations, 
such as plans of action. This notion relates to Lucy Suchman’s (1987) seminal argument 
stating that the “planning model” of action does not adequately describe situated activity of 
humans. Thus, movements of a living body are fundamentally intentional and mindful in 
themselves, in a manner that does not rely on reflective thinking but on recurring lived 
experiences of bodily action (Johnson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991). It is quite safe to say that 
the variety of everyday skills and coping with physical activities rely on such a body-based 
knowing originating in “muscle memory” and which most of the time remains unattended by 
us (in pre-reflective consciousness). However, it is important to acknowledge that this ability 
is not detached from rational thinking, but contributes to and brings forth our thinking and our 
perception of a stable reality (Johnson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991).  
Here, we want to promote the idea that technology should not be designed solely based 
on the notion of objective space, because it is after all only one modulation of space among 
many other equally coherent, equally possible formations. Objective space measures things in 
terms of their size, length or height, and their reciprocal spatial relations. This measuring 
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effectively dismisses the subjective, bodily-enacted experience of spatiality and the related 
kinesthetic perception of one’s body (via body-image and body-schemas, Gallagher, 1986), 
and it does not appreciate the embodiment of intentionality towards the environment and its 
sensorimotor meanings and affordances (Gibson, 1979; Noë, 2004). Intentionality emphasizes 
the immediate relationship between the embodied mind and the lived environment, thus “in 
saying that the mind is intentional, phenomenologists imply that the mind is relational. 
‘Being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger) and the ‘lived body-environment’ (Merleau-Ponty) are 
different ways of articulating this kind of relation” (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009, p. 27).  
 This embodiment of intentionality should be seen as a fundamental source of affective, 
social, ethical or aesthetic meanings we (as embodied subjects) naturally attribute to even the 
subtlest qualities of gestures and other body movements. Digital systems that respond to 
movement cannot understand the lived-through gestural meanings of the moving body, thus, 
“gesture recognition”, which has taken a pivotal role in HCI, is a misleading term. Digital 
devices can, for example, measure the coordinates of the body’s movements in objective 
space and interpret them as pre-specified gestures or poses through mathematical algorithms 
and symbolic catalogues of movement information. Arbitrary mapping of these gestural 
objects to certain commands of a user interface may easily lead to unnatural or imposed 
movements that distort the flow of natural or habituated movements in social contexts. Let us 
imagine, for example, an augmented reality application that uses certain facial expressions, 
such as eye winking and smiling, as means to respectively browse and select visual menu 
options displayed in the augmented reality glasses. In public situations, it is easy to imagine 
social misapprehensions and potentially embarrassing situations this gestural control may 
cause, considering the importance of facial expressions in interpersonal communication of 
affect. Even if the social factor is ruled out, instrumental use of emotional expression, like 
smiling, would be ethically a very questionable strategy. Just because it forces you to “smile” 
in order to fulfill some function, which in itself might have nothing to smile for. 
From the perspective of lived space, body movement is not something that could be 
captured in mere physical dimensions and harnessed lightly by its instrumental value. Rather, 
it is fundamentally about how we – as intentional agents – feel, perceive, interact and 
communicate through our body in situated moments. It is something that essentially embodies 
and enacts what we are, what we know and what we experience (see Noë, 2009). In short, 
movement is about life. And that is something one should never handle without care. 
 
1.2 Aim of the Study 
What is maybe not yet fully understood in the discourse of HCI is the dynamic continuum of 
human action(s) as an experiential whole. Instead of focusing on gestures as chunks of 
movement relating to users and devices, a choreographic approach (discussed in Parviainen et 
al., 2013a; Parviainen, Tuuri, Pirhonen, Turunen, & Keskinen, 2013b; see also Loke & 
Reinhardt, 2012) implies putting the focus on the flow of movements we perform in our lived 
environments. Here, choreographies include all bodily movements, routines, and activities in 
which movements appear to form meaningful interactions and relations in a lived space 
between different agents and inanimate objects. Unlike in the domain of dance, there is no 
choreographer who “alone could lead the dynamics of this constellation; rather, human and 
nonhuman agents have connections with each other that establish ongoing choreography” 
(Parviainen, 2016, p. 62). In this process, technological objects can be conceived as so-called 
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actants that influence human actions (see Latour, 1996), thus co-constituting choreographies 
through embodied practices and affordances being attributed to their design (as pre-
choreographic elements). In general this choreographic shift of focus helps to perceive (a) 
how discrete movements belong to a bigger whole of both spontaneous and 
orchestrated/arranged movements, (b) how these choreographies differ across times and 
places, and maybe most importantly (c) how movement and space are lived through by 
subjects (individual choreographies), and among subjects belonging a cultural community 
(social choreographies). 
By shifting the focus towards choreographies in the lived space, we aim to unveil the 
multidimensional aspects and phenomena that reside within the HCI paradigm founded on 
embodied interaction. In particular, we are interested in the concept of embodied control 
constituted within the choreographies of interacting with technology. Instead of just seeing 
ourselves in control, it is time to also consider how these systems are controlling our own 
bodily movements and choreographies, for example, by expecting particular types of 
movements from us. We will analyze and describe the effects of some body-based interfaces 
in terms of embodied control in a manner that goes beyond the instrumental user-to-device 
control scheme. The following section first examines optional theoretical stances on the 
phenomena of embodied control, and then presents a recapitulated formulation of the concept 
in three dimensions that are instrumental, experiential, and infrastructural. Finally, 
implications of the refined perspective are discussed in terms of interaction design and 
human–technology studies. Among the examples dealt with in the discussions, one particular 
domain of embodied interaction is more deeply covered. This particular example concerns 
interfaces for musical expression and interaction (in section 3.1). Musical interfaces may not 
appear as representatives of mainstream user interfaces, but for the purposes of this article 
they are illustrative examples because of their orientation towards embodied activity (e.g., 
Jensenius, 2007) and fluidity of processes both in performing music and in transformation of 
musical practices (e.g., D’Arcangelo, 2004). It could even be argued that they anticipate 
aspects of rich multimodal and embodied user interfaces by providing “excellent examples of 
sensorially rich and temporally-detailed human–machine interaction” (Tzanetakis, Fels, & 
Lyons, 2013, p. 1119). All in all, however, we aim at illustrating the phenomena of embodied 
control that are not necessarily dependent on any particular technology or field of application. 
 
2. DEFINING EMBODIED CONTROL 
 
2.1 Instruments of Control 
Already at the dawn of the modern computer-era, Norbert Wiener (1954, pp. 24–36) 
identified the theory of control in terms of communicative messages (as acts of control) and 
the gained feedback response (relating to the effect of control). An early developer of 
embodied interfaces, Myron Krueger (1977) followed similar line of thinking in his concept 
of a responsive environment, which refers to a system capable of perceiving human actions 
and providing action-relevant (auditory and visual) responses through the surrounding 
environment. Therefore, when thinking of the concept of embodied control, it seems 
straightforward to conceive of it through the idea of harnessing body movements as a means 
to produce input messages to a control surface in human–computer interaction. A marketing 
slogan for Kinect “You are the controller” (Microsoft, 2010) summarizes this approach aptly: 
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Dedicated controller instruments are replaced with “you”, by treating your body movements 
(referred to as gestures) as instruments for controlling an interactive system.  
Let us take a look at a currently prominent guide for designing gestures for embodied 
interfaces: Kinect for Windows: Human Interface Guidelines (Microsoft, 2013). What the 
guidelines in general emphasize is the ways that (a) gestures are appropriate for user task and 
its orientation and that (b) the intended control gestures can be reliably recognized and 
distinguished. Several design principles relate to, for instance, physical and cognitive 
ergonomics and utilization of natural interactions. The guidelines are also aware that 
instrumental gestures may generate problems with different contexts of use, urging designers 
to take into account user orientation, mindsets, locations, expectations, and sociological 
factors.  
…Kinect for Windows sees a person holistically. Kinect for Windows users are constantly 
moving and interacting with the world, whether or not they intend to be interacting with your 
application. Your challenge is to detect intended gestures correctly and avoid detecting ’false 
positive’ gestures. Keep in mind that users in a social context may alternate between 
interacting with the application and with other people beside them or in the vicinity. The 
application must be aware and considerate of the social context of the users. (Microsoft, 2013, 
p. 30) 
Considering the compact and practical scope of the guidelines, it is understandable that 
the offered design principles work as general reminders of things to take into account, not 
trying to provide more specific criteria and guidance for creating appropriate designs, for 
example, from the point-of-view of different user orientations. Guidelines urge designers to 
acknowledge things that may affect the usability of the application. However, some big 
questions may be raised in the reader’s mind: How to define the goodness of fit for gestures? 
How to define what is natural interaction? The guidelines avoid taking a stand on issues 
concerning how the application of gestural control can smoothly interface with the user’s 
everyday movements. The focus is placed on detecting the instrumental movements relating 
to application use from the “mere” natural movements, but the actual means to achieve this is 
left to the designers:  
With Kinect for Windows, it’s harder to distinguish between deliberate intent to engage and 
mere natural movement in front of the sensor. We leave the details of how to handle this up to 
you, because your specific scenario might have special requirements or sensitivity. (Microsoft, 
2013, p. 89, emphasis added)  
In the guidelines, gestures and their meaning are seen firstly through their instrumental 
value. Yet, it is important to notice that the basic significance of movements as 
choreographies of human life is somewhat recognized, but this aspect is mostly overlooked – 
or at least put into a secondary position.  
In the literature of musicology and game studies, there exist two interestingly similar 
taxonomies of body movements relating to playing musical instruments (Jensenius, 2007, pp. 
46–47) and playing games (Bianchi-Berthouze, 2013, pp. 49–51). Both of these taxonomies 
seem to make a basic division between movements instrumental to playing and other 
movements of the playing situation. The former class consists of required movements for 
control (sound-producing or task-control) but also movements that provide indirect support to 
performing them smoothly (ancillary, task-facilitating). The latter class includes movements 
that are not required but either accompany the playing (e.g., by following contours of musical 
elements or the player’s role in a gameplay) or otherwise relate to situated expression and 
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communication. Although these taxonomies explicitly take into account non-instrumental 
movements, their starting point nonetheless lies around the instrumentation of control, against 
which movements are defined and ordered.  The players’ orientation is also a matter that 
needs to be accounted for. For example, affordances of action are not necessarily constituted 
within the organization of an instrument’s mechanical functionality (e.g., gameplay 
mechanics). As shown in the example provided by Bianchi-Berthouze (2013, p. 48–49), 
expert gamers sometimes wanted to perform sport-like movements (involving the body in a 
simulated manner) in playing Nintendo Wii sport games, even though they knew that, due to 
the accelerometer-based controller, they would perform better in the game by moving the 
game controller with tiny and efficient hand movements (with little resemblance to the sport 
simulated in the game scenario). Thus, two distinct player orientations were outlined in the 
example: one of them focusing on mastering the instrument efficiently, while the other 
implies an engagement to the game scenario through its action affordances and the related 
choreographic engagement.2 If we chose to prioritize the latter orientation, we might actually 
come up with different taxonomical organizations where “pure” instrumental actions (relating 
to the actual control mechanics) become subordinate chunks of movement belonging to more 
holistic, goal-directed continuums of movement (e.g., emphasizing a “golf-swing” action over 
separately timed instrumental movements of a controller).3  
As we can see, taking care of different user orientations matters. But in order to actually 
perceive and outline these orientations the researcher ultimately needs to resort to a subjective 
stance on one’s space and the ways the instrument becomes part of it. 
 
2.2 Control We Live by 
It will help our analysis on embodied control if we first follow the contrast between objective 
and lived space – the two basic phenomenological categories of space we presented earlier. In 
other words, we should first consider the differences in seeing environments in terms of how 
they are lived through their indwellers instead of just treating actions and spatiality in 
objective and functional terms. Due to the nature of computing, smart technologies “sense” 
their environment through measurements and formal rules and treat human bodies like they 
were any objects that could be mechanically measured and modeled. While, for example, 
motion-capture systems can detect, measure, and categorize movement of such objects, in a 
lived space we interact within, our actions in and responses to these systems are not 
mechanical but unavoidably intentional and colored with affect – in a manner our actions on 
the world always are.4 Within lived spaces, the distinction between "natural" movements and 
instrumental movements (relating to intended user functions) becomes increasingly hard to 
 
2 A comparable scheme of players’ orientations with regard to musical instruments is discussed later 
in this article (see section 3.1). 
3 By the way, this line of thinking seems to have similarities with the idea proposed by Godøy (2011, 
pp. 239–240) on conceptualizing temporal continuums of musical sound-action awareness in terms of 
goal-oriented, holistic chunks, into which single musical events (e.g., notes) become hierarchically 
subsumed. 
4 This aspect seems to resonate with some of the outlined challenges (Picard, 2003) of affective 
computing. These challenges notably concern well-justified criticism towards handling emotions as 
discrete and recognizable objects or mechanical models. Relevant challenges also include the lack of 
understanding of situational factors of emotion expression. 
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identify and even impractical because of the necessary overlap between the two. Instrumental 
movements can never be “empty frames” without some natural, experiential meanings tied to 
the movement qualities. This was indicated, for example, in the Wii-game scenario presented 
above, where gamers used more involving movements for controlling because of the fun they 
provided (Bianchi-Berthouze, 2013). On the other hand, one does not necessarily have to 
experience instrumental movements as being directed to a system. As computing is becoming 
ever more ubiquitous and embodied, we are no longer mere users controlling systems from 
the outside, but rather, we dwell in these systems (Parviainen, 2011).  
So, how would an experiential conception of embodied control differ from instrumental 
control? The difference comes from the perspective: While instrumental control is about 
providing technical means to control – in terms that designers would describe as being 
convenient for a user task (in the third-person) – experiential control is about how individuals 
feel or conceive control in the first-person, in lived moments, in the lived space, through their 
body awareness. In other words, it is about how designs co-constitute experiences of control 
within interaction, not necessarily having any a priori assumptions about the object of being 
controlled. As we saw in the Wii-game scenario, the players’ orientations changed the 
experiential aspects of control: while the expert players prioritized mastering of the game 
controls, they were occasionally willing to give away that sense of control for an opportunity 
to experience the game differently. Therefore experiential control is also a question of how 
we are orientated to our lived space (including also interpersonal factors), what kind of action 
affordances we tacitly sense that either support or guide and restrict our momentary intentions 
and the related bodily engagement. For an expert player wanting to master the game as a 
system, the idea of performing sport-like choreographies may appear as a restriction or 
unnecessary imposition (i.e., choreographies are “pushed” at the player). By contrast, for a 
player wanting to engage with the game scenario, performing these choreographies provides 
support for his or her intentions (i.e., choreographies “pull” the player into a game). 
The concept of experiential control may be seen in a two-fold manner: Firstly, it is about 
the feeling of being in control within a perceived reality of a lived situation. Indeed, 
controllability has been defined as a key quality of a usable application in HCI literature 
(Alonso-Ríos, 2010) and as the standardization system of ergonomics for HCI (ISO 9241-
110, 2006). In the past, control was ideally implemented with dedicated controllers, but 
contemporary visions of smart-homes strive to make computing “disappear”, providing users 
with the ability to meld the technology into their everyday lives (Harper, 2003, p. 24). In the 
course of making technology invisible, one trend is to move away from dedicated controls to 
smart, proactive, and automated systems that follow and learn the habits of the residents and 
use this surveillance-data for anticipating and automatically responding to their routines (see, 
e.g., Aldrich, 2003). Although many might be fond of the central locking of doors and 
windows, or lights coming on when someone enters room, it might also severely disrupt the 
feeling of being the one in control. Another possible trend in making controls invisible is the 
so-called enactive approach to user interfaces (see Froese, McGann, Bigge, Spiers, & 
Seth, 2012). The basic idea is that control should be implemented as experientially transparent 
by avoiding positioning it between the user and his or her operational environment. For 
instance, instead of using hand gestures for giving dedicated commands to the system, the 
device or its functions can themselves experientially become an extension of our hand, 
seamlessly augmenting the enactive sense-making and control of the lived space. The 
 10 
enactive approach strongly relates to Heidegger’s (1962) phenomenology of tool-use which 
concerns how objects separate from the body can experientially become extensions of our 
body5, fused into an extension of a lived space and the related body-image and sense-making. 
It is indeed important to acknowledge the transformative effects of tool-use (with regard to 
enactive perceiving of the lived space) that force one to consider that “many different ways of 
perceiving the world are possible“ (Froese et al., 2012, p. 373), and that in this manner lived 
space also extends to virtual spaces experienced in an engagement with technology (such as 
user interface widgets, computer games, or social-media applications). Tool-use also reminds 
us that experiences of control are something that does not always require conscious attention 
to objects being used for controlling or interacting. For example, a wearable musical 
instrument, as a device that maps movements to musical parameters, can easily become 
transparent at a point where the player starts to feel that his/her body actions directly 
transform into musical interaction.  
The second aspect of our account of experiential control is about the conflicting feeling 
of having to self-control or regulate one’s own (intended or habituated) movement and actions 
in a present lived space. There are plenty of possible situational factors relating to 
implementations of technologies that might contribute to the need felt for modifying or 
restricting our movement, or regulating our spontaneous bodily display of affect. Such effects 
on movement are induced, for example, by needs to conform one’s bodily actions to physical 
barriers, to social norms of an environment, or to certain behavior expected by smart systems. 
For instance, future smart-home systems might make use of gestural interfaces based on 
optical motion-capture technology (similar to Kinect). Although the implementation of such 
interfaces is physically invisible, the active field of motion-capture is fully analogous to any 
physical barriers or social expectations that shape our movements at home. When such a 
system continuously monitors and traces movement in a living room, potentially reacting to 
the specific movements (gestures) in space, people have to be careful in their moving and 
posturing, to avoid giving “wrong” signals through their body. They might even learn to 
intuitively suppress their activities to avoid performing certain kinds of bodily movements in 
certain places, eventually constituting new or modified norms of bodily behavior. Gaze-
tracking glasses, as a means to interact with smart household items, might pose similar issues 
of restricting the experiential freedom of looking around. In public situations there is often an 
increased pressure to conform to social and cultural norms in the ways one interacts with 
technology (e.g., Reis, de Sá, & Carriço, 2008). For example, we might be embarrassed to use 
gestures or voice because of the deeply rooted communicative (interpersonal) expectations 
relating to these interaction modalities. This is especially true when instrumental gestures 
clash with the natural affective communication among other people.  
It is also important to note that the two mentioned aspects of experiential control do not 
exclude each other. For instance, while the wearable musical instrument of the previous 
example might have the great and natural feel of being in control of musical sounds (via 
 
5 A related conceptual framework is the one of extended cognition by Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers (1998; see also Clark 2008). In it, tools – both the uses of tools as well as the results of tool 
use – are conceptualized as extensions of cognition. The Cartesian division into mind and body is 
given an extreme critique while the borders between assumed mental events and their physical 
reflections are straightforwardly denied. 
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transparent control within free body gestures), it might make you feel embarrassed or 
uncomfortable with the movements and poses emerging through the playing performance. 
Mapping free body or limb movements to musical expression, by using optical motion 
capture or sensors such as accelerometers or gyro meters, might also severely restrict the 
player's freedom to spontaneously perform body movements and expressions that are not 
directly related to sound producing (e.g., ancillary, sound-accompanying, and communicative 
movements, see Jensenius, 2007, pp. 46–47). Therefore, depending on the orientational 
disposition of a player, experience of playing such an instrument can appear as a feeling either 
of gaining or losing control. 
 
2.3 Infrastructures of Control 
Dourish and Bell (2007) have investigated the conditions for ubiquitous computing by 
considering spaces as infrastructures and focusing on embodied action in both practical and 
cultural organizing of such infrastructural spaces. Their approach to the organized utilization 
of spaces is applicable to the analysis of embodied control. While zooming out from the 
experiential focus outlined above, we build the third dimension of infrastructural control 
roughly on these ideas. This dimension basically concerns the question of how every piece of 
technological design ultimately participates in establishing and organizing infrastructures that 
control people’s movements and embodied use of space. From the digital alarm clock that 
wakes us to the fully automated and integrated smart-home system, computer code is 
extensively and intimately woven into the fabric of our everyday lives (Kitchin & 
Dodge, 2013). In fact, all design choices with regard to built environments partake in this 
phenomenon. However, infrastructural control is not only in the hands of designers, but 
rather, the creation of these infrastructures is an emergent process involving larger groups of 
people. Nonetheless, every design contributes more or less to this societal impact.  
Before we get involved further with the question of infrastructural control it is necessary 
first to consider how technological infrastructures contribute to our perception or how 
perception is technologically mediated. McLuhan (1964) is well known for his notion of 
technology whereby technological devices are an extension of the human cognition and 
organism. Extensions of the body cover a wide variety of different instruments: from 
handmade tools to vehicles and technologies for transportation and media. Infrastructures, 
such as roads and lighting, and other fixed structures, such as buildings, can be seen as 
extensions of the human organism. While these extensions open up possibilities, that is, work 
as affordances, they simultaneously impose constraints and frames on human behavior. Don 
Ihde (1990) in his philosophy of technology goes even further and argues that technology can 
never be separated from our perception and experience. Technological items seem to become 
part of our embodiment in the manner that technology mediates our experience of 
environment or world. Ihde calls relations between human beings and technology 
embodiment relations. In an embodied relation we experience the world and objects through a 
machine, so in this sense, technical devices and their infrastructures always transform our 
perceptual capacities. In activity theory (see e.g. Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006), the mediating 
role of tools is stressed. In its emphasis on social structures, activity theory sees the role of 
tools as two-fold. First, the tools shape the ways in which we interact with our environments. 
Second, since tools have been created and transformed in the development of a given activity, 
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they themselves reflect the knowledge of people who have been involved in it. In other words, 
in the use of tools social knowledge is cumulated.  
While strongly relating to technological and material organization of lived spaces, the 
heart of infrastructural control lies in immaterial interpersonal phenomena such as 
construction of social and cultural norms and habits; for example, how people are expected to 
organize the furniture in living rooms, or what kind of technology should be included. Thus, 
each culture’s present conceptualizations of what is home, how it is normally organized, 
consequently creates models for what kind of movement, choreographies, and bodily 
engagements with the lived space are normally expected. For example, we currently might be 
on the verge of an emerging norm where almost every family member is recurrently or 
continuously engaged with smartphones and other mobile devices, and day-to-day 
communication with family and friends also involves the use of these gadgets (e.g., Lin & 
Atkin, 2014). According to a marketing survey from the Sparkler Research Agency (2013), 
thirty percent of families in UK regularly use smartphones or tablets to talk to each other 
when they are in the same house. Such a change in family communication would also involve 
changes in the lived space families reside in. These might include, for instance, a shift of 
emphasis in communication towards favoring technologically extended perception of the 
social space. Another home-relevant example could consider the camera-based motion-
capture technologies, which may currently be restricted to the use of gaming systems (such as 
Xbox One). Therefore the effect that these technologies have on infrastructures of the home 
might now seem trivial. But as discussed in the earlier subsection, even the current 
implementations carry potential for significantly changing the organization of a lived space. 
Moreover, it is rather safe to assume that the volume of applying similar motion-tracking 
technology, for example to different smart-home applications, will increase in the future. At 
that point, emphasis on designing gestural controls that do not inappropriately collide with 
people’s daily lives becomes a much more serious issue.  
Besides being manifested through sociocultural habituations, infrastructural control can 
also be based on and be enforced by institutional norms, guidelines, and legislations. For 
example, there are usually different kinds of regulations with regard to building houses and 
technology. Also, big manufacturers of technological products (such as Apple, Microsoft, or 
Samsung) may have the power to directly influence trends and emerging norms through their 
products and marketing. One part of the infrastructural control in the hands of institutions 
relates to opportunities to monitor people’s movements and activities through specific 
technologies in specific actual and virtual milieus. A large part of such monitoring may just 
locally serve the appropriate operations of certain smart applications, but there is always the 
possibility that the data from such surveillance is stored in a concentrated repository for 
whatever future purposes of a corporate or governmental institution. One can also see 
monitoring in the light of constituting and upholding infrastructures of embodied control. For 
instance, Parviainen (2016) has concluded in her account of choreographies of biomonitoring 
that knowledge infrastructures of monitoring (involving Big Data generation) are reciprocally 
connected to personal embodied practices. 
What are then the differences of infrastructural control when compared to the other two 
dimensions of embodied control? Infrastructural control does not concern the questions of 
how body movements can be dedicated to controlling something, but it concerns how 
infrastructures of devices and the related practices and social norms control our movements 
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and our embodied use of a lived space. Also, it does not concern particular experiences of 
control in lived spaces, but construction of infrastructures that control and organize our lived 
spaces and the perceived action possibilities within (i.e., through affordances that either allow 
or constrain). There is, however, one relevant link to instrumental control: it relates to the 
ways that designers can make dedicated choices in their designs that either support or 
suppress the construction of certain infrastructures that have an effect on movement. 
 
2.4 Discussion of Embodied Control 
We have performed an analysis on the concept of embodied control in order to reveal 
phenomena relevant to interaction design that go beyond the idea of harnessing body 
movements as instruments of control. This idea might usually be the first and also the most 
straightforward way to conceive embodied control, for example, in cases of providing gestural 
control for applications. In all, three dimensions of embodied control (instrumental, 
experiential, and infrastructural) were identified and they are summarized in Table 1.  
 
 
 
With regard to the lived experience of control, we find it useful to investigate the 
relevance of this dimension to interaction design through push and pull effects. These effects 
concern situational factors (relevant to design) that either push forth a perception of barriers 
that we feel guiding or forcing us, or support our orientation and thus adapt to our pull. Push 
effects in design relate to a felt conflict between our tacit orientation and the action 
affordances of a built environment. It should be remembered that affordances here can also 
function as constraints, that is, they imply what not to do or what you might need to do 
instead. Pull effects are the opposite as they relate to a downstream perception of action 
affordances that corresponds to the situational intent and our tacit orientation of bodily 
engagement. Subjectively, they seem to enable and encourage “just the right kind” of 
engagement with the design. In simpler (maybe even oversimplified) terms one could say that 
push and pull effects relate to the feeling of being controlled and to the feeling of being in 
control, respectively.  
Let us imagine, for example, the task of transforming a normal city street into a so-called 
people’s street, which will have restrictions on car-traffic while giving more freedom to 
pedestrians. In order to enforce such a transformation, one might want to design new 
constructions for the street that give clues to both car drivers and pedestrians that the 
environment and the expected choreographies differ from the normal streets. These 
constructions may include, for example, plantings, artwork or park benches placed to block 
straight driving lines (push effect for cars), while also encouraging pedestrians to “take over” 
the street space (pull effect for people).  
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Of course, it is often far from easy to be absolutely sure what aspects of the design 
concern push or pull effects, since it is fundamentally a matter of the individual’s situated 
experience. Moreover, it is important to remember that push and pull effects also relate to 
those situational factors that are outside the domain of the particular design and thus cannot 
always be influenced by it. With regard to designing embodied interactions, one may well 
argue that environments or systems that are designed to use movements non-intrusively, 
embedded in the meaningful movements of the context (as a whole), might more easily 
contribute to the rise of pull-type affordances (and immersive tool-use experiences). But on 
the other hand, it could as well be argued that harnessing natural movements to embodied 
control might lead us to being more self-critical and self-sensitive towards our normal 
movements in that given space, thus creating push effects. In some contexts, a deliberately 
clear distinction between the functional movements and the movements natural to the context 
might generate a desirable feeling of being in control, as also implied in the Kinect guidelines 
(Microsoft, 2013).  
An interesting case to be investigated in terms of pull and push effects is tangible user 
interfaces (TUI; term and abbreviation coined by Ishii & Ullmer, 1997). TUIs can be argued 
to be a re-invention of classical tools. Once you have a, say, hammer in your hand, is the 
design more an enabler (pull-effect) or does it merely force you to hit a nail in a strictly 
designed way (push-effect)? It appears that in the recent enthusiasm for TUIs the control-
aspect has not been adequately elaborated (see, e.g., Djajadiningrat, Wensveen, Frens, & 
Overbeeke, 2004; Klemmer, Hartmann, & Takayama, 2006; Müller, Schwarz, Butscher, & 
Reiterer, 2014). In this kind of notions the concept of control is only used to refer to the user-
interface elements, which enable the control of a given application. What would be needed is 
a better understanding of the importance of perception of being in control. 
Another issue closely relevant to pull and push effects lies in the conception of persuasive 
technologies. As the name suggests, this paradigm deliberately aims at persuading people or 
users to change their behavior through engagement with a piece of technology. Persuasive 
designs try to outline and utilize certain motivational affordances (see Hamari, Koivisto, & 
Pakkanen, 2014), which increasingly relate to gamified interaction and situated psychological 
rewarding. A known example of persuasive design is Piano Staircase (discussed in Peeters, 
Megens, van den Hoven, Hummels, & Brombacher, 2013) in which a staircase next to an 
escalator was transformed into a functioning piano keyboard, with the intention to draw 
people towards using the stairs. Another example of persuasive technologies is provided in 
car dashboards with gamified rewarding for eco-friendly driving. These dashboards, for 
example, show visualizations of leaves and vines that grow and flourish in accordance with 
the efficiency of driving (Froehlich, 2014, pp. 578-579). Finally, the recent Pokémon GO 
phenomenon (see e.g., Greiwe, 2016) counts as an effective example of creating an 
augmented reality game world (through smart phones) that gets people moving and exploring 
their surroundings in a new way. Although the main ethos in using these kinds of 
motivational affordances leans towards pull-effects, it seems that persuasion can potentially 
relate to both push and pull types of affordances. Arguably, the perspectives of embodied 
control presented should also be beneficial for the investigations of persuasive or gamified 
interaction design. 
One may also ask whether push effects are negative and pull effects positive. Such values 
may be attached to these concepts, but nevertheless, it is not that straightforward at all and 
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will ultimately be dependent on the contextual whole. For example, highway speed cameras 
are designed to guide us to restrict our driving speeds, possibly against our momentary will. 
In a broader sense, speed cameras belong to the infrastructure that upholds traffic rules and 
the norms of safe driving. Therefore the potentially experienced push effects constituted by 
speed cameras (due to constraining our driving) may have both positive and negative values, 
depending on the viewpoint. In all, it should also be noted that none of the dimensions of 
embodied control are either good or bad in themselves. Either positive or negative aspects can 
be attributed to any of them. 
 
3. DESIGN IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this section we further discuss how the conceptualization of embodied control and 
push/pull affordances introduced above has an effect in designing and pre-choreographing 
interactive systems and interfaces. First, the issues of instrumental and experiential control are 
discussed within a context of musical interfaces. Then we switch to a wider socio-cultural 
perspective in order to reflect matters relating to infrastructural control. Finally, we 
summarize the discussion of implications by considering design perspectives and methods.  
 
3.1 Instrumental and Experiential control in New Musical Instruments 
Musical interfaces have already been considered earlier in this paper, but now let us take a 
slightly closer look at these systems of interactive computing, also known as New Interfaces 
for Musical Expression (NIME).6 Following the HCI tradition of conceptualizing interaction 
between humans and devices as a composition of inputs and outputs (e.g., Card, Moran, & 
Newell, 1983, p. 26), NIMEs too are often conceived as information systems consisting of 
control interfaces (for input) and a sound generation unit (for output). This is evident, for 
example, in the digital musical instrument model provided by Miranda and Wanderley (2006, 
p. 3), in which gestural controller input and its mappings to sound production are considered. 
While such a conceptualization gives a clear picture of how technical instrumentation and the 
flow of information is organized, it does not provide support for understanding the 
experiential domain of musical interaction, in which embodied intentionality of actions and 
sensorimotor integration are central concepts (see Tuuri, Pirhonen, & Hoggan, 2009).  
NIMEs usually utilize wide varieties of different sensor technologies and interaction 
paradigms in creating a diversity of novel control spaces for musical interaction (Lyons & 
Fels, 2014, slides 17–20). We want to stress here the importance of looking beyond the input-
output model, thus not conceiving of control spaces merely as instrumental spaces delineated 
by sensors, physical performance and the related input information. In order to better 
understand the musical interaction in these spaces and the ways that embodied control appears 
in them, it is helpful for us to switch the focus away from technologies and to try to see such a 
control space from the subjective and intentional viewpoint of the musician playing the 
instrument. That is, how the player is oriented experientially to the lived space of musical 
engagement. Such an orientational disposition is essential in delineating how experiential 
 
6 NIME also refers to an annual conference (www.nime.org) and its surrounding community of 
researchers and artists. 
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control (and its push and pull effects) appears, and what kinds of choreographies are afforded 
or expected within a given stance to musical interaction.   
Firstly, one can outline an orientation in many ways comparable to playing traditional 
instruments such as the piano. In this stance, the actions on a control space are primarily for 
producing (and precisely controlling) musically organized sounds. Hence, the related NIMEs 
enable a practical, ergonomic, and preferably tangible interface, which is mapped for making 
music in terms of musical concepts, structures and habits (i.e., the musical potential is seen 
through producing, for example, notes, scales, and/or chords). We can call this a musicking-
stance.7 NIMEs that strongly correspond to this stance include, for example, touch-based, 
tangible instruments like the Continuum fingerboard (Haken, Abdullah, & Smart, 1992) or a 
music glove with discrete touch sensors for each note (Myllykoski, Tuuri, Viirret, & 
Louhivuori, 2015). Secondly, a clearly contrasting orientation could be called an indwelling-
stance, in which a person explores "reversibility between sounds and movements that is 
grounded in imagery or real events in the Lifeworld" (Parviainen, 2011, p. 645). Lifeworld 
here refers to epistemological relatedness between the embodied mind and the environment, 
co-constituted by the player’s actions. Movements and gestures within a control space, and 
their sonic mappings, thus give rise to a subjective sonic world for one to dwell in and interact 
with, while being analogous to sensorimotor interaction with the physical environment – its 
ecological consistency and its “resistances” (see, e.g., Peters, 2013). According to Parviainen 
(2011), indwelling is closely related to building bodily knowledge through both passive and 
active movements in the sonic environment. Many NIMEs that map sounds to free body and 
limb motions correspond well to this stance, for instance the Embodied Generative Music 
system (utilizing full body motion-tracking, Eckel & Pirrò, 2009) or gesture-based music 
gloves (utilizing wearable motion sensors, Mitchell, Madgwick, & Heap, 2012).  
In sum, the musicking stance is in general oriented to the instrument and its affordances 
for making music while indwelling concerns being "inside" the instrument and its realm. To 
some degree, it may also be argued that the experiential aspects of musicking and indwelling 
are both potentially present in playing, regardless of the given NIME and its features. In this 
sense, the nature of stances could be compared to listening modes (see Tuuri & Eerola, 2012), 
which refer to different intentional constituents of meaning-making in the process of listening. 
Although the musicking stance might be encouraged in playing instruments where controls 
are laid out in musically structured ways, it does not prevent a player from immersing 
themself into an existence within a sonic realm (in playing) that is not necessarily founded on 
the given musical structuring. Conversely, instruments providing more environmental or 
“ambient” action-sound affordances (implying support for the indwelling stance) may as well 
be used in expressing with musically organized rhythms, pitches, harmonies, or clusters of 
sound. Finally, it is important to remember that while the musicking stance is oriented to the 
instrument, the intentionality of musical interaction yet extends beyond technical 
instrumentation. For a skilled musician, any instrument can become functionally transparent, 
meaning that the player feels as if he or she were directly interacting with music (Nijs, 
Lesaffre, & Leman, 2013). Hence, the musician’s intentionality is directed towards objects of 
music, which can be considered as “inner” models of music (as suggested in Nijs et al., 2013) 
 
7 The term musicking is coined by ethnomusicologist Chistopher Small (1998) referring to music as 
something we do. 
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or as metaphors and image schemas relating to embodied conceptualization of the music 
being played (Johnson, 2007; Wilkie, Holland, & Mulholland, 2013).  
By introducing the two stances we want to point out that actions and movements of 
musical interaction relate to orientational dispositions that provide different frames for 
understanding the intentionality in bodily musical interaction, including the ways that situated 
affordances and push or pull effects of embodied control potentially become organized in 
one’s experience. When considering the engagement with a NIME from the musicking stance, 
pull effects may, for example, relate to the ease and robustness of conceiving action 
possibilities for playing specific notes and melodies, thus controlling the sonic output in terms 
of affordances relating to objects of musical discipline. From the indwelling stance also, pull 
effects are about the feeling of being in control – albeit in a very different way. Arguably, pull 
effects in this stance relate to the qualities of NIME to allure the player into trying out, 
exploring and learning the virtual sonic world (and its consistent "sonic ecosystem" within). 
In a way this stance may be called existential, because the alluring qualities of sensorimotor 
coupling of sound and movement can make the interaction and the related movements 
themselves rewarding or pleasurable, even without any clear goal to play specific 
premeditated sounds. Therefore, the felt agency within an action-sound ecosystem can be 
considered as a motivational (pull) factor in itself.       
In general, it can be said that push effects within both of the stances should relate to the 
felt intrusiveness of choreographed movements required in performing. Basically this is a 
question of how much these (often implicit) pre-choreographies attributed to a design cause 
conflict with the experience of freedom or spontaneity in the flow of musical expression. 
NIME pre-choreographies relevant to the musicking stance habitually resemble the ways 
traditional instruments are played, in a sense that they force one’s hand or both hands (or 
mouth) into specific playing positions and actions (“glued” to the instrument), but otherwise 
permit free movement (within the limits of the mobility of the instrument). Push effects may 
also relate to the incoherent mapping strategies with respect to musical control (that is, how 
musically inconsistent the mapping of physical actions and sounds is).  The indwelling-stance 
again is different, for example in respect of permitting freedom of movement. In a way, the 
instrumental mapping of movements in NIMEs most relevant to this stance focuses 
particularly on utilizing our very “natural” movements. If we manage to immerse ourselves in 
sensorimotor dwelling within the sonic feedback of the system, we might not experience any 
intrusive push effects. However, playing with the movements of your whole body inevitably 
leads to extensive, obtrusive, even dancing-style choreographies and poses. In some systems, 
even the spatial position of the player (e.g., on the stage) can be mapped to some controllable 
sonic parameters. Thus, embodied control through pre-choreographies is all-invasive and 
potentially very intrusive.  
Again, this is not to say that choreographic control, manifested through the design, in 
itself would be either good or bad. The appropriateness and value of pre-choreographies of a 
NIME designs depend heavily on the context and the purpose of movements. During a stage 
performance, tightly choreographed and imposing playing movements can be very 
appropriate, communicative and even inspiring to the performer and the audience. On the 
other hand, as a practical tool of a musician, having to perform dance-like choreographies 
might not work that well. But if considered as a therapist's tool, such choreographic control by 
means of alluring – or even pushing – a person into producing certain movements can be very 
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beneficial (see, e.g., Bergsland & Wechsler, 2015; Vogt, Pirró, Kobenz, Höldrich, & Eckel, 
2009). In such contexts, the sonification of movements builds up motivational affordances, 
through which a therapist can choreograph certain patterns of movement (for a therapeutic 
purpose) to be performed. It has been found that felt musical agency in movement can also 
reduce the exertion in a strenuous physical activity (Fritz et al., 2013), further illustrating the 
rewarding effect of an agency-relevant sonic feedback.  
There currently exist quite a few theoretical accounts that describe NIME related design 
spaces. These concern, for example, functional characteristics of different instruments 
(Birnbaum, Fiebrink, Malloch, & Wanderley, 2005), dimensions that describe movement in 
terms of range, precision and haptic feedback (Bongers, 2006, pp. 157–175), or principles for 
developing interface technologies for expressive musical instruments (Overholt, 2009). All of 
these accounts offer a valuable contribution to outlining a conceptual dimension space of 
possible NIME design attributes, but their scope of analysis does not specifically embrace 
experiential stances and intentionality of interaction, even though many of their dimensions 
are clearly relevant to the experiential perspective. In general, the focal point of these 
accounts is more or less linked to the instrumental (i.e., input-output related) 
conceptualization of interaction. This is also reflected in the taxonomy of functional aspects 
of musicians’ movements (Jensenius, 2007, pp. 46–58), which is inspired by the concept of 
instrumental gesture (see Cadoz, 1994). In the taxonomy, movements that have an effect on 
sound output are put in focus, and only them are treated as goal-directed actions. This may 
encourage overlooking the goal-oriented nature of embodied interaction that extends beyond 
the instrumental functionality (i.e., activity directed to more holistic musical objects/goals, 
such as patterns of melodic progression and phrasing, that can also be manifested in “non-
instrumental” movements). Moreover, with regard to the functions of gestures, Cadoz (1994) 
has also formulated a notion of an epistemic function, which we interpret as referring to 
knowledge and information about the environment being acquired (and enacted) through 
movements. Unfortunately, such a function has not been included in the account of Jensenius, 
although it seems that it would fruitfully tap into experiential (sense-making) aspects of 
interaction, especially in relation to the indwelling stance.  
In the development of NIME theories, there is room for improvement in terms of 
describing how a design space (or its dimension) should account for lived experiences of 
embodied musical interaction. Within an experiential perspective, the affordances and goal-
directedness of musical interaction can be re-considered through different orientational 
dispositions (such as musicking, indwelling, and those yet to be discovered). Also, instead of 
focusing too much on the instrumental scope of controlling sound, more effort could be put 
into acknowledging the reciprocal relationship of control between player-actor(s) and 
instrument(s). We feel that one way to reveal aspects of this reciprocal relationship is to 
consider musicians’ movements as choreographies and to evaluate what kind of 
choreographic elements (i.e., pre-choreographies) are attributed to NIME designs. Within a 
“choreographic dimension space”, it would not only be important what kind of 
choreographies produce certain sounds, but also what kind of choreographies are constituted 
and expected in playing, and what kind of experiences of control (push and pull effects) they 
induce in their contexts. 
Through the discussion on NIMEs, we have tried to exemplify how the perception of 
push and pull effects depends on different subjective orientations. That is, how a person 
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engages with the NIME in lived terms, what kind of intentional aspects are constituted in the 
engagement and how he/she conceives of the musical interaction and its affordances. We 
think that the orientations discussed here have relevance to embodied interaction that extends 
beyond music-related applications. Earlier in this article, comparable orientations have 
already been discussed in the context of gameplay interaction (see section 2). Of the two 
orientations, to some degree, the musicking stance corresponds with the traditional idea of a 
task-oriented user who sees himself/herself operating the device from the outside, and who 
seeks convenient and discrete functionality for accomplishing the intended goals. From this 
stance, choreographing of natural movements may feel intrusive and thus they may better be 
considered as clearly separated from functional movements of an emblematic nature. The 
indwelling stance is quite the opposite. In this stance a person positions himself/herself inside 
the system, where he or she is not necessarily driven by any clear task, but rather, by 
motivations arising from being and interacting with this Lifeworld of augmented reality that 
combines actions with sounds. This seems to correspond somewhat with ideas of invisible 
and ubiquitous computing, where technology more or less transparently embeds in our natural 
embodied being and interaction with the environment (and the emerging affordances). 
 
3.2 Control Infrastructures of Technology, Information, and Human Action 
As bodily beings, we are always part of some technological ensembles and their 
infrastructural control. What constitute infrastructural control is not just the technological 
gadgets, as these are simply material components, but also the entire set of related practices 
and norms around them and the technological needs and interests they serve (Guattari 1995, p. 
36; Mumford 1995, p. 305). Many current visions of future technologies suggest that 
standardized technological ensembles such as the Internet-of-things will be taking place on an 
ever greater scale. In these visions, computerized everyday commodities such as refrigerators, 
ovens, cars, mobile phones, and toasters start to communicate with each other, forming larger 
assemblages in which human activity, information, and materiality intertwine (see, e.g., 
Savat, 2013). While aiming to offer everyday convenience, well-being, entertainment, or 
security for their users, these technological ensembles are also increasingly sensing us and 
gathering information for constructing data profiles of individuals and groups. Systems are 
becoming increasingly proactive and thus reliant on different types of user-data, data-driven 
models and algorithms to anticipate certain actions and predict their likely consequences with 
a view to eschew risk and forestall unwanted actions.  
Proactive computing as a form of control curtails a person’s range of future options, to 
allow or disallow a person to act in a certain way. But this kind of control does not just rely 
on immaterial (e.g., social) practices and norms, but on algorithmic infrastructures as well – 
the “smart fabric” (Kûchler, 2008) into which we “code” our lives through quantified 
choreographies among devices. This is the crucial mechanism of the assemblage that 
determines proactive operations of a system and algorithmically enforces the control. But who 
is in control, after all? As our actions are involved in the code generation, one can well argue 
that the resulting control infrastructure is (at least partly) based on our own subjective 
expressions. How much the user feels he or she has control over, for example, proactive 
functions of smart-home systems, depends on many aspects. One of them is the procedural 
transparency the system either offers or doesn’t offer to users with regard to the ways it 
gathers data from their actions and how it is utilized. The idea is often promoted that 
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algorithmic processes and data-driven systems are purged of human bias and based on neutral 
and objective decisions (Ajana, 2015), but the algorithms ultimately reflect specific purposes 
of applications, together with the explicit and implicit values and intentions of their designers. 
Choices about data, connections, inferences, interpretation, thresholds for inclusion (in 
classification), and the overall procedural transparency to the users are neither neutral nor 
objective.  
One simple example to demonstrate the relationship between human activity and 
proactive applications is playlist-based music listening (see, e.g., Hogan, 2015), where 
playlists are curated according to certain criteria (e.g., mood) and statistical data and models. 
Contextual factors (such as location, time and biometric measures) can also be used to 
enhance the situational appropriateness (e.g., Wang, Rosenblum, & Wang, 2012). Music 
listening is usually considered as a free form of cultural participation where choices of music 
reflect individual experiences, desires, and identity as well as cultural identity and norms. 
Although listening at first maybe doesn’t seem to have anything in common with 
choreographies, playlists, as chronologically organised choices of music, can also be seen in 
terms of choreographed activity. Thus, curated playlists – based on either human curators or 
algorithms – functions as an instrument to choreograph personal listening procedures. 
Without adopting any opinion on the appropriateness of the curated playlists from the listener, 
they ultimately require a certain givenness to algorithmic control. In terms of infrastructural 
control, it is not just a question of playlists and their algorithmic underpinnings, but rather 
how new practices and cultural norms emerge in relation to the general acceptability and 
desirability of “giving away” some of the intimate relationship with music. Should the 
automated playlists become more common, they potentially start to have impact on the norms 
to which we conform our habits – how we are involved with music and how we participate in 
music as a culture. Although we may partake in shaping the algorithms, ultimately it may as 
well be that they are shaping us (Steiner, 2012). 
Ajana (2015) suggests that the proliferation of data and profiles across networks and 
platforms gives the impression that identity is increasingly “abstracted” from the lived bodies 
in a way that emphasizes a kind of Cartesian approach to body and mind. A Big Data 
techniques approach sometimes reduces individuals to what Deleuze (1992) calls “dividuals”; 
bits and digits dispersed across a multitude of databases and networks, and identified by their 
profiles, tags, pins, tokens, credit scoring, and so on, rather than their subjectivities. They do 
not address people as whole embodied persons with a coherent, situated self and a biography, 
but rather make decisions on the bases of singular signs (Ajana, 2015). This, in turn, poses 
many ethical challenges in terms of the ways in which practices of collecting data and 
profiling mechanisms end up partaking of processes that impose certain identities while 
obstructing others. 
In Value Sensitive Design, Friedman and her colleagues (2006) demonstrate one attempt 
to provide an ethical framework that accounts for human values in a principled and 
comprehensive manner throughout the design process. Their list of human values comprises 
human welfare, ownership and property, privacy, freedom from bias, trust, autonomy, 
identity, and environmental sustainability. Values are viewed neither as inscribed into 
technology, nor as simply transmitted by social forces. This comes close to Roger’s (2006) 
critical view of Weiser’s vision of calm computing. Rogers suggests that instead of trying to 
design “calm” technologies, with an intention to embed them into our everyday life in a 
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natural and fitting manner, we should also design them to be exciting, stimulating and even 
provocative – causing us to reflect upon and think about our interactions with them.  
 
3.3 Design Perspectives and Methods 
The contribution of this article for designers lies in reformulating the concept of embodied 
control in a manner that gives rise to novel design perspectives. It encourages problematizing 
some established perspectives that may often be taken as evident truths. Most prominently, as 
already discussed in the paper, these include the oversimplified schema of taking the concept 
of control in human–technology interaction predominantly as something that the user directs 
to the device he or she wants to operate, as well as seeing gestural and body-related input 
methods as self-evidently easier or more “natural” ways to give control to the user. Our 
analysis of embodied control elicits the omni-directionality of control between the user and 
the device, and within the assemblages of human agents, devices and material and social 
environments. On the other hand, it also emphasizes the perception of control as lived 
experience involving push and pull types of affordances of the lived environment. But most 
importantly it helps make more explicit the embodied control over people that designers have 
in their possession through the designs. Table 2 summarizes the above discussion into design 
perspectives in accordance with each type of embodied control.  
 
 
 
In our analysis, choreography has functioned as an assistive concept. Focusing on 
human–technology choreographies helps to bring forth and describe the contextual effects 
that different devices and technological ensembles impose on our bodily doing and being. 
Choreographies provide a concrete way to handle embodied temporality in HCI, and they can 
also be flexibly applied to both objective and subjective perspectives of investigation. Thus, 
in addition to analyzing choreographies in objective space (e.g., as trajectories and patterns of 
movement) the same body movement can be treated as lived bodily experience, by conceiving 
of spaces in terms of the embodied engagement they constitute in a living person. For 
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example, conceiving of the intended usage of gestural input in terms of choreographing a 
user’s movements makes the two-directional nature of the instrumental control explicit to the 
designer. On the other hand, through subjectively viewed choreographies, the related design 
considerations of push and pull effects on the feeling of control should be more intrinsic. In 
regard to human–technology studies and interaction design, choreography most prominently 
refers to acknowledging how design choices (and the included pre-choreographies) have an 
effect on movements and actions while also acknowledging the existing choreographies (such 
as routines and social habits) of the given situations.  
We propose that the choreographic approach can be useful for thinking human–
technology interaction “out of the box”, for embracing movement especially in subjective 
terms of agency in lived space. In addition to focusing on devices and their use, we suggest 
that every design case should utilize an alternative – or parallel – standpoint with the focus on 
movement and the activities that people do. From the choreographic standpoint, the design of 
technological devices is accounted for in terms of how they partake in what we do or interface 
with our routine activities in the lived space. In other words, devices may be assessed in terms 
of how they make us move and make us feel involved, how they support our activities and 
even produce novel yet natural ways to engage us with the physical and social environment. 
As a movement-centered approach, it does not make a difference between artifacts of a 
different technological nature; technological devices, furniture, and walls of a room can be 
conceptualized through choreography of the same context.  
Methodologically speaking, a choreographic approach can utilize many of the current 
design methods in the proposed direction. This does not mean that those phenomena we 
intend to grasp with the presented approach would be automatically covered in the present 
methods – such as in applications of use scenarios (e.g., Carroll, 2000). What it does mean is 
that, as low-level tools, methods are applicable to the choreographic approach. It also means 
that through a mixed-method approach or even within a single method the shift of focus can 
be strategically applied back and forth between use-oriented and choreography-oriented 
standpoints. For instance, use scenarios intrinsically are centered on application use, but 
certain segments of scenario-based design and analysis can be organized in a manner that 
explicitly shifts the focus to choreographies, while removing the technology to-be-designed 
from its focal point. Also, data from a user observation study (involving, e.g., video 
recordings or motion tracking) can be reflected upon the choreographic criteria. The usage of 
both standpoints is even recommended: although the deliberate shift from usually such a 
“magnetic” use-orientation would reveal important phenomena and relevant layers of 
experience that might have otherwise remained hidden, neither of the standpoints is sufficient 
alone but the process of design and research needs both of them.  
The essence in utilizing the choreographic approach for designing technologies of 
embodied control chimes with the appeal of Svanæs that a user should be seen “as an 
intelligent living body” (2013, p. 25). Therefore methods for inspecting choreographies need 
to put emphasis on rich bodily experimenting, in regard not only to the form and function of 
gestures, but also to the lived intentional basis and other experiential qualities in movement 
and actions. We see that bodystorming (Oulasvirta, Kurvinen, & Kankainen, 2003), embodied 
sketching (Marquez Segura, Vidal, Rostami, & Waern, 2016), and any kinds of methods 
relying on our “capacity to think in movement” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2013, p. 19) are 
particularly appropriate for coherently handling and making explicit both the instrumental 
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design of bodily motions and their “lived aspects”. Such practices thus can simultaneously 
produce both quantitative (objective) and qualitative (subjective/felt) information on 
movements. Describing the felt dimension of movements is challenging, but detailed 
information on the structures and contents of particular lived experiences (such as single 
movements) can be obtained retrospectively by using specific explication interview 
techniques (Petitmengin, 2006). One should consider using sketching and the explication 
interview together as parallel processes (guided by an interviewer) that combine the 
kinesthetic creativity of embodied sketching with the elicitation of situated intentionality, 
feelings, and mental images (relating to conceived interaction, imagined responses to the 
movements being sketched, and experiences of control).  
The significance of use scenarios lies in their potential to provide frameworks for 
understanding choreographies in their contexts. In terms of lived experiences, different 
orientational dispositions that give rise to, for instance, different push and pull type 
affordances may be addressed in writing scenarios. Scenarios can also explicitly identify 
movement qualities and specific situational aspects (material and social) that constitute 
choreographies (see an example of such analysis in Loke & Kocaballi, 2016). Furthermore, 
we want to highlight the potential of utilizing a first-person perspective and a participatory 
(enactive) approach to use scenarios. A potential practical implementation of these ideas is the 
application of so called Rich Use Scenario (RUS; see Pirhonen, Tuuri, Mustonen, & Murphy, 
2007). The core of RUS is to apply a first-person perspective in the form of a story, which 
provides a vivid imagery of the use of an application. The story can be used in participatory 
sessions, similar to the workshops proposed by Svanæs (2013, pp. 21–24), where movement-
focused design is acted out “with the lived body”. The aim is to get RUS participants to 
immerse themselves into the story and to experience the flow of events and activities through 
its character. The technology to-be-designed is taken as a part of the lived environment in 
which the person interacts. The emphasis in the development of RUS was originally user-
interface sounds, but the same approach could be applied to identifying and enacting oneself 
with the choreographies of a story in which actions belong to lived continuums of movement 
that have meaning as a larger whole. These continuums are relevant in understanding 
situations where contextual choreographies interface with technologies. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we presented and discussed a newly organized and coherent view of the concept 
of control in the context of embodied interaction and human–technology choreographies. This 
view considers embodied control among humans and technologies within a three-dimensional 
ontological and epistemological foundation, in comparison to the instrumentally emphasized 
conception of control. Our intention in performing the analysis was not to produce 
“obscurantist discussion”, thus making things deliberately more complex than needed. Rather, 
our intention was to shed light on the phenomena of embodied interaction that too easily 
remain hidden or become obscured in designing technologies that tap into human movement 
and everyday activities. Therefore we see that the multifaceted view of embodied control 
eventually provides support in design processes becoming more considered and mindful. 
While it provides a richer view on design possibilities, it also makes explicit the 
responsibilities of every designer in developing instruments of control that partake in 
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choreographing human movements. We have suggested in this paper that the overarching 
utilization of the choreographic viewpoint can help designers in conceptualizing the effects 
that designs have on people’s movements. The diversity of different design perspectives, 
unfolding upon the renewed definition of embodied control, highlight the need for using a 
heterogeneity of approaches in designing and building technologies of embodied interaction. 
It reminds us of Mark Weiser’s 20-year-old vision of building invisible, ubiquitous 
technologies. A slide in his symposium keynote-presentation in 1994 states that the starting 
point of building these technologies is not in technologies themselves, but in “arts and 
humanities: Philosophy, Phenomenology, Anthropology, Psychology, Post-Modernism, 
Sociology of Science, Feminist Criticism”, and finally, “Your own experience…”. Below 
that, he added, “This is the most important part of the talk. You may not get it on first hearing. 
Patience.” (Weiser, 1994, slide 10). Today, we still need that patience. 
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